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Abstract
South America relations with Southeast Asian countries have flourished during the 
last decade. This dynamism was fueled by the economic trade complementarities 
and the increasing demand for Asian economies of primary products and 
its manufactures. Our aim in this paper is to identify and analyze the latest 
developments of interregional initiatives between Southeast Asia and South 
America, considering also the contributions of bilateral and multilateral policies 
in enhancing the interregional links.
Resumo
As relações da América do Sul com os países do Sudeste Asiático floresceu durante 
a passada década. Este dinamismo foi alimentado pelas complementaridades 
comerciais econômicas, e a demanda crescente das economias asiáticas de 
produtos primários. Nosso objetivo neste artigo é identificar e analisar os últimos 
desenvolvimentos de iniciativas inter-regionais entre o Sudeste Asiático e América 
do Sul, considerando-se, portanto, as contribuições de políticas bilaterais e 
multilaterais em melhorar as ligações inter-regionais.
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Introduction
East Asia countries have become, in the last 15 years, important partners for South American states in search of trade and political diversification. This dynamism was fueled by the 
economic complementarities of the product and export structures of 
the two regions and the increasing demand for Asian economies of 
primary products and its manufactures. In tandem and very closely 
María Florencia Rubiolo
Universidad Siglo 21, Secretaría de 
Investigación, Cordoba – Argentina 
(frubiolo@gmail.com).
Copyright: 
• This is an open-access article distributed 
under the terms of a Creative Commons 
Attribution License, which permits 
unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided that 
the original author and source are credited. 
• Este é um artigo publicado em acesso 
aberto e distribuído sob os termos da 
Licença de Atribuição Creative Commons, 
que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e 
reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que o 
autor e a fonte originais sejam creditados.
ISSN 1518-1219
47
JOURNAL OF
GLOBAL STUDIES
M
ER
IDIAN
O
http://www.meridiano47.info
South America and Southeast Asia interregional relations: Beyond South-South Bilateralism 2
Meridiano 47, 19: e19013, 2018 Rubiolo   
linked to the raising trade numbers, bilateral ties have strengthened between individual countries of 
these two regions, showing the increasing relevance of East Asia presence in South America. Although 
China concentrates the focus on both the economic and political arenas, other Asian countries have 
emerged as relevant partners for South America. Southeast Asian countries are gaining greater 
protagonism in this trend, given their sustained demand, expanding markets, and more symmetric 
power status to that of South America, in the international structure. 
Notwithstanding the mainly bilateral nature of these links, there are emerging multilateral 
and interregional initiatives. They are not institutionalized or permanent instances; their main 
characteristic is their sporadic nature, and their dissimilar outcomes depend on the actors involved 
and the typology of interregionalism. The most developed of these interregional initiatives are FEALAC 
and Mercorsur-ASEAN dialogue. 
These emerging initiatives are part of the discussion of interregionalism, more specifically, 
the new interregionalism. Although some voices argue that these processes have begun to become 
outdated given the renewed prominence of bilateralism— mainly due to the shift from a unipolar to 
a multipolar world (Baert, Scaramagli, and Soderbaum 2014) and to the failure of international trade 
negotiations in WTO rounds (Tussie and Trucco 2010)— it must be noted that interregionalism, 
multilateralism and bilateralism act rather as complementary instances particularly in the cases of 
non —Triadic relations1. 
As Doidge (2011) suggests interregional relations are usually nested in other levels of relations, 
as bilateralism, multilateralism and regionalism. Thus, bilateralism and interregionalism must be 
understood in the same context of relationships, since they can coexist and be mutually determining. 
Our aim in this paper is to identify and analyze the latest developments of interregional initiatives 
between South America and Southeast Asia, considering also the contributions of bilateral and 
multilateral policies in enhancing the interregional links. In this part of the article, we will introduce 
the notions of multilateral utility (Dent, 2004) and hedging utility (Rüland 2011). They both help 
understand the characteristics of regional integration in both regions and also contribute to shed 
some light on the obstacles to South America-Southeast Asia interregionalism. 
Finally, we adopt a Non-Triadic interregionalism theoretical approach and argue that in order to 
understand these emerging phenomena it is fundamental to develop a South-South interregionalism 
perspective that considers the particular characteristics of this type of interactions. We highlight 
diversification and autonomy as two central concepts —both as tools and goals— of this emerging 
interregional layer of South American-Southeast Asia relations. 
1 Triadic interregionalism refers to relations between the “Triad”, which consists of North America, EU-Europe and East Asia. Of 
these three poles the latest is considered the weakest (Dosch, Jacob, 2010). Non-triadic interregional relations are the ones between 
less developed or peripheral regions, this is the case of South America and Southeast Asia. 
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Overview of interregionalism
The recent development of interregionalism as a field in international relations analysis identifies 
these relations as a new layer within the system of global governance (Doidge 2011) or global order 
(Hanggi et al. 2006). This means that, in addition to the perspectives that focus on the State, the 
region or the system to address international issues, there is an increasing number of works and 
authors introducing the interregional level as an emerging and fundamental instance in analytical 
studies on contemporary global and regional dynamics.
Interregional relations suppose that the regions have acquired a level of autonomous external 
agency, with the ability to relate as units with state or regional counterparts. In recent decades, we 
have witnessed a proliferation of interregional initiatives, a phenomenon that has a close relationship 
with the resurgence of regionalism in the late 80s. The characteristic features of this new regionalism, 
as it has been called, are linked to the changes in the distribution of global power, the importance 
of the world economic agenda, the end of the bipolar division, and the emergence of new problems 
related to these changes. Consequently, primarily as a tool to address these new challenges, regional 
initiatives flourished around the globe with a variety of levels of institutionalization. 
This new wave of regionalism is frequently analyzed in relation to globalization as the structural 
and most determining systemic condition. There are, on the one hand authors that suggest that 
regionalism is produced as a response to the negative effects and challenges of globalization (Morales 
Fajardo 2007). In this respect, regionalism from the less developed world that expanded during 
the 80s contrasts with regionalism from the early 50s and 60s, since the recent one was mainly a 
defensive response to the economic marginalization of much of the southern hemisphere (Grugel 
and Hout 1999). The latter was due to the expansion of the neoliberal economic model that favored 
competition for market shares based on an unequal distribution of power and relative gains among 
nation-states, placing the less developed world in a clear and decisive position of relative On the 
other hand, it is seen as a tool of integration to globalization (Mittelman 2000), favoring a regional 
integration scheme that works as a platform to better adapt to international economic dynamics.
Regionalism then may be proactive as well as defensive (Hanggi, Roloff, and Rüland 2006). In 
the latter, it is a tool to deal with a number of economic and security challenges originated externally 
to the region and it assumes that integration can enhance individual capabilities of each state through 
coordination of policies rooted in the pursuit of shared interests. In addition, regionalism can adopt 
different levels of institutionalization, from intergovernmental cooperation —with a low level of 
institutionalization— to the construction of regional and supranational institutions.
There is a further classification of types of regionalism according to their contribution to regional 
governance. Dent developed the concept of “multilateral utility” to refer to the contributions that 
a regional block can make to international multilateral institutions. According to Dent’s definition 
regions that have a high level of multilateral utility are those that have a positive impact in multilateral 
forums fostering stability, peace, prosperity, and equality in the global system. It also empowers 
relevant institutions at the international level and prevents actors from undermining the multilateral 
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order. (Dent 2004) The author distinguishes multilateral utility from multilateral deference. A regional 
institution that has a multilateral utility not only demonstrates its consistency with or deference to 
the regime order of multilateral institutions and supports their invisible goals, it also “proactively 
engages in global public policy issues by substantively advancing debate and developing or proposing 
new mechanisms by which these may effectively be addressed.” (Dent 2004:222)
Within multilateralism, there is a type that Dent identifies as “contested multilateralism”. This 
kind of multilateralism is critical of one or more aspects of the global multilateral institutions, goals, 
and processes. Most of them emerged in the less developed countries (LDC) blocks, “frustrated over 
advanced industrial economy dominance of multilateral economic institutions and their agendas” 
(Dent 2004:220). We mention this kind of multilateralism because it better suits the regions under 
study in this paper. As an example, countries of both, South America and Southeast Asia, have raised 
questions over the international trade system, that is regarded by several LDC as unequal in the 
distribution of gains and in the set of rules, as well as, in the practices some developed countries are 
still allowed to implement. Agricultural subsidies are at the core of these critics and have become 
during the last 15 years an unavoidable obstacle to the success of WTO negotiations. 
Closely related to this notion Rüland develops the concept of hedging utility by which he refers to 
regions that act more pragmatically and less normatively, “regarding multilateral institutions primarily 
as devices to influence the regional and global power equation” (Rüland 2011: 84). This definition entails 
a more materialistic view of international politics, away from the more institutionalist and idealistic 
view we could perceive in Dent’s definition of multilateral utility. We believe that Rüland’s concept 
better captures the nature of regional processes both in South America and Southeast Asia as well as 
the interregional initiatives between them. As the author also highlights, South-South regional and 
interregional processes tend to be less institutionalized, to be more inclined to bottom-up subsidiarity, 
and in most cases, the decision making processes tend to lock in disputes over norms, procedures, and 
solutions to identified policy problems (Rüland 2011). South American regionalism —particularly 
Mercosur, in a subregional level, and Unasur — show many of the characteristics described above as 
hedging utility regionalism. For example, Unasur is a result of a Brazilian design and it is oriented 
by two central Brazilian foreign policy goals: its search for autonomy and its willing of becoming a 
regional and global power (Sanahuja 2011). South America regionalism is considered by the Brazilian 
elite as a platform for global projection (Serbin, 2008), demonstrating a feature of hedging utility 
rather than multilateral utility. In sections below, we will readdress these characteristics, especially 
in relation to South America’s regionalism. 
South America as a region differentiated from Latin America is of recent creation and has had a 
scarce participation as a whole in the international level. Given this fact, the concept of interregionalism 
cannot be applied to the whole region, but to the subregional initiatives, such as Mercosur and to 
individual states engaging in transregional processes. 
What definition of interregionalism is more suitable to this region’s relation with Southeast 
Asia? Given the low level of regional institutionalization and the diversity of international economic 
orientations within the region, the concept of interregionalism must be flexible, including more 
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than just the institutionalized interregional initiatives, and considering transregional and hybrid 
processes. 
The classical and most extended definition of interregionalism is the one that refers to pure or 
bilateral interregionalism. The notion includes the relations between two clearly identifiable regions. 
It involves meetings with some level of regularity, on issues related to the exchange of information 
and specific areas of cooperation; based on a low institutional level, without common institutions, 
where each group depends on its own regional structure (Rüland 2001: 44).
This typology has little analitycal scope in the case of relations between non-Triadic regions or 
South-South relations. This limitation derives from the fact that many of the regions are dispersed 
and porous without clearly identifiable boundaries and has a low level of activity as a region. At 
this point, Hanggi’s distinction between regional groups and regional organizations is of upmost 
relevance in the case of South America. While the second refers to an institutionalized instance, the 
first describes an unorganized or dispersed region. This implies that bilateral interregionalism goes 
beyond relating regional institutions and can also include relations between a regional group with a 
regional organization, or two regional groups with each other. (Hanggi 2006).
These three versions of bilateral interregionalism are complemented by two other types: 
1) relations between countries belonging to two or more regions, also known as relations mega-regional 
or transregionalism, and 2) linkages between groups or regional organizations and third individual 
states, known as quasi-interregional relations (Hanggi 2006). They both bloomed, as did the non-Triadic 
bilateral type, during the new interregionalism wave in the post-Cold War period. Transregionalism 
and quasi interregionalism are border cases within the typologies on this phenomenon. 
In the first type, although states are identified as belonging to certain regional groups, they 
act in their individual capacity. They are mostly dialogue processes with a fuzzier membership that 
does not necessarily correspond with regional organizations and they may include member states 
from more than two regions (Rüland 2006). 
In the case of quasi interregionalism, Rüland (2006) argues that this concept has been used as 
a residual category and covers a wide range of relationships, such as “imagined interregionalism” 
(Holland 2006) and “interregionalism without regions” (as in the case of IBSA). According to Hanggi 
(2006) quasi interregionalism, although it can play an essential role in relations between two regions, 
it may also prevent or hinder the development of a region-to-region interregional process, because 
the individual State participating in this process is usually the leader of a region. 
The regional counterpart can settle closer to that state actor and underestimate relations with 
the rest of the region. The role of Brazil in relation to Mercosur and South America as a whole may 
be illustrative of this phenomenon. 
Besides the typology of interregionalism, there are usually differentiated goals behind these 
processes, depending on the characteristics of the participating regions or states. In interregionalism 
between regions of the Triad the main objective is the maintenance of balance in the international 
system, which derives from the view that the system is characterized by power and conflict, increasingly 
economically rather than military. In this sense, interregionalism contributes to maintaining the 
balance of power between the major economic actors. 
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As Dosch (2004) points out, the driving forces behind non Triadic interregionalism —or peripheral 
interregionalisms as he puts it— are profoundly different. Olivet (2005) explains that this is due to 
the following reasons: a) the actors involved are not military or economic powers, but low to medium 
power countries; b) the volume of economic transactions, both in trade or investments, between them 
is insignificant compared with the great powers, and; c) their levels of institutionalization are even 
lower than in the cases of interregionalism within the Triad. This means that their structure cannot 
significantly affect the international system or contribute to the structure of global governance. 
If the nature of the actors envolved as well as their capacities and relative power differ from 
the Triad, also the reasons to relate with another developing region vary. Olivet affirms that the 
main motive to embark on an interregional process for less developed regions from a structural 
perspective is diversification. “What regions seek to do with a diversification strategy is to solve 
a threefold problem: first, reduce the economic and political risks of dealing with relatively few 
external partners only; second, prevent themselves from being eventually discriminated in the case 
that certain regions were captured by few partners causing the exclusion from possible benefits; and, 
third, enhance their participation in a globalizing world economy in order to avoid international 
peripherization” (Olivet 2005: 22). This function of the interregional process is regarded as central 
from a realist theoretical perspective, but as different authors suggest, it is not the only one. Not 
even in South-South interregionalism. 
According to Doidge (2007b), even in processes between developing regions —which he calls 
developmental interregionalism— it must be differentiated the type of region participating in order 
to identify the goals. The author distinguishes interregional initiatives between strong regional actors, 
weak regional actors, or a combination of the two. “This recognition has allowed the disaggregation 
of interregionalism into two functional varieties: (i) an internally focused, capacity building 
interregionalism; and (ii) an externally focused, globally active interregionalism” (Doidge 2007b: 242).
Regarding the functions, two other ones can be distinguished for non Triadic interregionalism 
particularly in the cases where there is an asymmetry between the parts : “Intra-regional institution 
building: whereby weaker regional actors are effectively forced to cooperate more closely in order to 
engage more fully with their interregional dialogue partner” (Doidge, 2007a: 19) and ; Collective identity 
formation: whereby the process of interaction with a common external ‘other’ at the interregional 
level leads to a reinforcement of identities at the regional level (Doidge 2007a:19, Gilson 2002, 2005).
In other words, the role of interregionalism as a tool to strengthen the regional block is defined 
from an institutionalist point of view. It might be easier to distinguish in cases where useful to the 
regional process already has a set of institutions in function —such as MERCOSUR, but not the case 
of UNASUR— or in the cases where the interregional interactions are constant and recurrent. Again, 
this is not the case of South America-Southeast Asia relations yet. So, this function is less observable 
in the interregional process between these regions. 
As regards identity formation, interregionalism also contributes to the formation of identities 
by confronting a comparatively weaker organization with an “other” outside with a stronger identity. 
This stimulates the formation of a responsive collective identity (Hanggi 2000). Gilson exemplifies 
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this with the case of Asia: “Asia acts as Asia for the purpose of engaging with the EU, and in the 
process of that interaction is responded to as though its interlocutor is responding to ‘Asia’, thereby 
reinforcing a sense of communal identity among a group not previously constituted for any other 
purpose” (Gilson 2002: 24).
But again, this constructivist function is hardly noticeable in the interregional initiatives between 
South America and Southeast Asia. We understand that the low level of activity in the interregional 
sphere, along with the still limited mutual knowledge between both regional spaces, are limiting the 
potential of the interregional approaches for identity reinforce. Notwithstanding this point, since 
bilateral links have flourished during the last two decades, and the interactions in the bilateral and 
transregional level have multiplied, we understand that these multilevel approaches can contribute 
to the interregional links, even when there are scarce examples of strictly defined interregionalism 
initiatives. 
To add to the complexity of interregionalism between developing regions, the case of South 
America has its own particularities. It is a region with a very recent definition as such, which is in the 
process of configuration. It does present a stronger actor within the regional limits —Brazil— that 
has a distinctive influence in the regions definition. And, as we will analyze in the following section, 
Brazil’s foreign policy goals and concepts are intimately related to its regional power role and, as a 
consequence, to South America’s regional performance.
Diversification and autonomy as driving forces for South America
Diversification is not a new concept in South American foreign policy analysis and is closely 
linked to bilateral foreign policies, as well as regional. It has been present in previous periods, 
especially during the fifties and sixties related to the ISI model, and again during the eighties along 
with the wave of redemocratization that went through the region. But during the late nineties and 
2000s, there were new internal and external conditions that favored this reformulation of foreign 
policy towards diversification that set the scene for the rapprochement to non-traditional partners, 
such as Southeast Asia. 
Southeast Asian countries had a minimum presence in South America until the beginning of 
the 21st century. But, there was an increasing interest in South American leaders to learn from the 
Asian miracle experience after the World Bank’s report was released in 1993. This was an external 
condition that awakened, in the first place, the interest from South American politicians and economist 
towards Southeast Asia. This came along with the changes adopted across Latin America, proposed 
by the nowadays not so well known Washington Consensus. The 1997 Asian crisis combined with the 
Brazilian crisis in 1999 and Argentinian crisis in 2001 set the economic and political environment 
for a change in the international insertion strategies and foreign policy priorities in South America. 
In addition to the conditions, Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) highlight that the September 11 
attacks and the difficulties arising from the Doha negotiations ended up influencing policymakers, 
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within an international context in transformation. These conditions generated, on the one side, the 
distancing of the United States from South America in the military dimension and, on the other, the 
abandonment of the multilateral negotiation strategy towards bilateral strategies in the commercial 
dimension. There were other external conditions that influenced the orientation of South American 
foreign policies as the variations in the prices of commodities, the growth in Asian demand, the 
Chinese approach to South America, and the 2008 economic crisis. The approach to East Asia was also 
influenced by the fear of Latin American leaders of being marginalized from the growing attention 
given by Europeans and the United States to the Asia Pacific region (Faust and Franke 2004:54). These 
orientation towards Asia were also connected to the internal changes operating in South American 
economies. The deepening of export-oriented based development strategies, and the growing of East 
Asian demand of raw materials and its derivatives made it clear for Latin American elites that it was 
necessary to diversify the foreign policy agendas and ties. 
Notwithstanding, the goal of achieving economic development remained unchanged, this 
means that foreign policy and international economic politics were still means to achieve domestic 
development goals (Van Klaveren 1992). So what changed? The instruments and the partners, mainly. 
With the failure of the neoliberal measures Argentina and Brazil had adopted and the scarce gains 
that the close relationship with the United and other international powers, such as Great Britain, 
had shown for this two South American economies, the political leaders abandoned the centrality 
of foreign policy in traditional partners, and began to stimulate diplomatic and trade ties with other 
major international actors. China became a central player in this strategy, but not the only one. 
Regarding the instruments, we highlight the arguments that after the failure of neoliberalism 
in this region and the limited benefits, if any, that the privilege given to traditional economic and 
political partners had represented for the South American economies, there was a reorientation of 
foreign policy instruments and goals. By this we mean that diversification of partners became a 
mean to achieve a greater margin of autonomy in decision making that could reduce the high level 
of dependency generated during the previous decades. Therefore, autonomy and diversification are 
two central concepts to incorporate in any analysis of South American foreign relations, including 
interregional ones. 
Defining autonomy is not an easy task given the long theoretical tradition and the many 
ramifications this notion has gone through the last decades. It has been both, a goal and an instrument 
for many Latin American foreign policymakers, particularly from Argentina and Brazil. According 
to Briceño Ruiz (2015), regional integration and cooperation in Latin America were conceived as 
mechanisms to gain a greater margin of autonomous decision in front of extra-regional powers. 
Autonomy has been associated to the idea of regional integration since independence in this region. 
Although there have been no systematical theoretical developments around these topics until the 
second half of the 20th century, many Latin American leaders and politicians —such as Simon Bolivar, 
José Martí, Francisco Bilbao— thought and wrote about Latin American integration and autonomy 
as connected concepts.
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In terms of theoretical analysis, Puig and Jaguaribe were two pioneers in the systematization 
of the theory of autonomy that had been in Latin American foreign policy tradition many decades 
before. In Puig’s view, autonomy was a phase in a continuum starting from subordination to complete 
autonomy, which could be transformed in capacity of national decision making (Bernal Meza 2015). 
For Puig, “To autonomize means to widen the leeway margin and usually implies cutting out the 
opponents” (Puig 1987, 33 in Bernal Meza, 2013: 46). In his realist view of the international system, 
Puig understood that the main goal of a less developed country had to be related to achieving a greater 
margin of autonomy in decision-making processes vis-à-vis powerful counterparts. But this goal was 
not only to be achieved unilaterally, it was closely linked to regional integration and alliances to 
negotiate with external actors from a coordinated position. Although Puig elaborated these concepts 
during the late Cold War period, they are still valid to study regional politics, particularly those of 
Brazil and Argentina. The goal of achieving economic development has remained unchanged for both 
countries, and even though there has been a traditional debate between dependency or autonomy in 
foreign policy orientations in South America, autonomy as a concept in foreign policy has been revived 
in the last 15 years in Argentina and Brazil mainly. It coincides with the need to diversify external 
relations towards emergent economies and Southern regions, in order to lessen their dependency 
on central traditional partners, both economically and politically.
Regarding diversification, Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) developed the concept of autonomy by 
diversification which proposes that the more diversified the external links are, the higher the margin 
of autonomy will be for a developing country. According to the authors, autonomy by diversification 
refers to the adherence to international principles and norms through South-South alliances —including 
regional ones-, and agreements with non traditional partners, in the belief that these strategies 
reduce asymmetries in the external relations with powerful counterparts and increase the national 
negotiating capacity (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007: 283). The Asia Pacific region is viewed as one 
of the main targets within this diversification strategy. Although the authors construct this concept 
of autonomy by diversification to explain Lula’s foreign policy towards non-traditional partners, we 
suggest that it can be applied to interregional relations as well, and as a theoretical tool to understand 
the objectives behind the multilevel approaches from South America to Southeast Asia.
South America Southeast Asia incipient interregional initiatives 
So far, we have reviewed a wide range of concepts that are useful for analyzing interregional 
relations between developing regions, and then we have established that, although, with a still nascent 
and emerging institutionalization, South America is set as a region and presents the potential to act 
as such within the region and, to a lesser extent, externally. In the latter sense greater difficulties 
can be observed, particularly in dimensions such as the economic — commercial one, in which each 
state or subregional organization despite pursuing similar objectives such as diversification, they 
implement disparate, not to say incompatible, strategies.
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It is for this reason that we suggest that interregionalism rather than an alternative to bilateral 
relations is a complement in the case of the South America-Southeast Asia ties. Therefore a broad 
and flexible theoretical approach is necessary because it is very subtle the line that distinguishes 
cases of bilateralism from hybrid interregionalism or transregionalism. An example of this is the 
Chamber of Commerce ASEAN —Mercosur that although includes both institutions, in practice it 
represents the South American bloc but establishes bilateral links with states members of ASEAN. 
Undoubtedly, bilateral relations have been those that have shown greater progress in bringing 
South America to Southeast Asia. Within this level, further development has occurred in the commercial 
area, along with the increase of trade numbers and signing of free trade agreements (FTAs). 
Regarding bilateral trade, Brazilian and Argentinian numbers show the greatest increase in the 
region, both in absolute and relative terms. In the case of Brazil, exports to the main SEA partners 
grew from 1.5 thousand million dollars in 2012 to 10.4 thousand million dollars in 2016. In percentage, 
SEA accounted for 2.5% of Brazil’s world exports in 2002, and for 5.6% in 2016. Argentina shows 
an even more outstanding performance regarding the relevance of SEA as an export destination. In 
2002 the Asian region received only 3.2% of Argentina’s total exports —which accounted for 842 
million dollars— but in 2016 the figured went up to represent 10% of the country’s world exports, 
totaling 5.7 thousand million dollars (based on data from ALADI, 2017). For both South American 
countries, trade relations with SEA are becoming a priority in their external agendas. 
Concerning FTA in effect on the date, among the South American countries with FTAs Chile 
is on top of the list with treaties signed with Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore Thailand and Vietnam, 
and secondly Peru with agreements with Singapore and Thailand. (Observatorio América Latina 
Asia Pacífico 2014).
We understand that the signing of bilateral FTAs, state-to-state, can have opposing consequences: 
on the one hand it indirectly allows to bring the regions closer by promoting access to the regional 
market through the unilateral entry to individual markets; on the other it discourages multilateral 
trade and economic cooperation in South America because, unlike ASEAN, Mercosur does not allow 
the signing of unilateral FTAs by its members. Thus, the fact that some South American countries 
sign agreements unilaterally is opposite to multilateral trading initiatives and can hardly result in a 
step towards an interregional approach through regional institutions of trade. 
In this context, interregional relations between Latin America and Southeast Asia are still at 
an early stage. Although there are processes of rapprochement between the two regions — the main 
one is the Forum for East Asia Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC)—, economic interdependence 
remains weak and there are profound differences in the ways of understanding cooperation. While 
in East Asia there tends to be a broad, open and flexible regionalism in South America there are still 
contending views towards regional integration that translates into the greater fragmentation of regional 
markets tending to competition within the region, as Medalla and Balboa (2009) have pointed out.
Yet there are clear interregional initiatives that show the interest of both regions for an approach 
that complements bilateral relations, with targets exceeding the mere commercial interests. Countries 
of both regions are involved in trans-regional bodies in their capacity as individual states, such as the 
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Economic Council of the Pacific Basin (PBEC), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the FEALAC. They consist of large networks of 
interregional dialogue, which also include actors like the United States and Canada, and addressing 
a broad agenda of issues. Of the four agencies, the only one that includes all countries in South 
America, and Southeast Asia is FEALAC (Rubiolo and Baroni 2011). 
FEALAC has become in the last decade the main forum for interregional participation for both 
Latin America and East Asia and a permanent interaction mechanism. Although it has become more 
active through the years, FEALAC still has a very low impact capacity on the international system. 
This is one of the reasons why it is considered a case of peripheral transregionalism. To this Dosch 
(2005: 185) adds the fact that the volume of economic transactions is still insignificant, and that one 
of the regions involved, Latin America, does not belong to the Triad while the other, East Asia, is 
the least powerful pole within it, at least in political and security terms. The main objective behind 
FEALAC for both regions is balancing through diversification. By this, we mean that Latin America 
and East Asia embarked on this transregional process with the aim to balance US influence and 
to improve their negotiating capacity in North-South relations. It should also be added that both 
regions regarded FEALAC as a tool to enter each other markets and avoiding being marginalized in 
a context of increasing economic interdependence and globalization. 
At a lower level of geographic and thematic scope, there are initiatives such as the Mercosur — 
ASEAN summit, which is a case of bilateral interregionalism (region-to-region). This initiative had a 
precedent in the mid-nineties with the promising but unsuccessful attempt to establish a program to 
implement a framework— the Mercosur ASEAN dialogue— for economic and political cooperation 
between the two regional groups. The first Mercosur — ASEAN meeting that took place in Brasilia in 
2008 finally marked the beginning of a structured dialogue with the aim of starting formal talks for 
the establishment of a permanent forum for cooperation between the two organizations. Interregional 
trade was among the central themes, an area in which both groups agreed that closer economic 
cooperation should have a gradual approach (building block approach). 
The advances of this meeting have not yet been continued in similar instances, the Second 
Ministerial Meeting has not yet been concretized. However, some initiatives in line with this interregional 
dialogue process can be observed. The most important of these is the accreditation of permanent 
ambassadors to ASEAN by Brazil (March 2011), Argentina (January 2012) and Uruguay (April 2014). 
Finally, the most recent action of interregional character is the Mercosur ASEAN Chamber of 
Commerce (MACC), launched in June 2015 in Montevideo. Unlike previous initiatives, this organization 
is the product of private enterprise actors with the approval and support of the governments of the 
Mercosur countries. Likewise, they have the permission of the Asian organization to take its name. 
Its main objectives are: 1) familiarize the countries of a bloc with the culture of the counterpart, 2) 
to promote trade relations and investment, 3) to provide information about business opportunities 
in member countries of the regional blocks, 4) to collaborate with small and medium enterprises to 
do business with Asian counterparts, 5) to facilitate the resolution of commercial disputes, and 6) 
to collaborate with embassies in organizing trade missions (MACC 2016).
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The operation of the MACC actually shows an approximation of the Mercosur countries as a 
bloc towards individual ASEAN countries. This is a case of hybrid interregionalism —state to the 
region— rather than bilateral interregionalism. 
Indicators of this type or interregionalism are the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Philippine Chamber of Industry and Commerce and the MACC —in June 2015— and the 
visit to the Singapore-China Chamber of Commerce and Industry —26 June 2015— (MACC 2015). 
From the initiatives analyzed here we can discern, first, that interregionalism between South 
America and Southeast Asia must be understood from a flexible and broad definition of this concept, 
because, beyond the case of the Mercosur ASEAN Meeting, there have not been instances of bilateral 
interregionalism as defined above. Second, any analysis on interregionalism including South America 
should take into accounts the asymmetries and differences within the region, particularly in the 
economic realm. For instance, Mercosur approximation to ASEAN is essentially distinct than that 
of other states of the region, such as Chile’s or Peru’s, which implement a more flexible model of 
international insertion (flexible regionalism). 
These different and mutually exclusive dynamics of extra-regional trade integration can be a 
limiting factor when thinking about a more comprehensive scheme to regionally approach Southeast 
Asia from South America.
Final remarks
Interregionalism between South regions cannot be analyzed and understood within Triadic 
theoretical frameworks. This is clearly the first conclusion we can draw from this paper. Then, the 
obvious question to ask is, how do we build a theoretical network that can be applied to South-South 
interregionalism? To start with, it should include local and regional foreign policy concepts and 
tools —such as autonomy for South America-. Secondly, it must contemplate the asymmetries within 
the region, in terms of models of international participation or insertion as well as the existence of 
regional powers and their international projection through the region. In the case of South America 
this would imply including a differentiation between Mercosur countries —which are committed 
to certain external norms— from non-Mercosur members, and also understanding Brazil’s role as 
a regional leader. Also, besides the different typologies of interregionalism, we should consider 
the role of non-state actors in these processes —such as the private sector— that also encourage 
interregional initiatives. 
As we have analyzed, existing processes of interregionalism between South America and Southeast 
Asia are characterized by their flexibility, wide thematic range and a low level of institutionalization. 
These are all characteristics of what Ruland defines as ‘hedging utility’. This means that South America 
Southeast Asian interregional relations, rather than contributing to international multilateral institutions 
and the given multilateral order, they tend to operate as a balancing tool and a mean for achieving 
individual and collective goals, but defined from within the regions. These goals, as we have discussed 
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previously, are related to the fear of being marginalized from a growing interdependent world, but 
especially from some regions that are deeply integrated. Besides this, interregionalism within these 
two regions is seen by South American countries as a way to strengthen its own negotiating position 
in multilateral forums and as a balancing to US influence, particularly in the views of Argentina and 
Brazil. The need to diversify foreign relations has a reflection not only in bilateral foreign policy but 
also in regional and interregional agendas. If autonomy is a core concept for Brazil and Argentina, it is 
foreseeable that they will tend to a multilevel diversification strategy, in order to diminish dependency 
on a few central powers. Still, the central role given by Southeast Asia and South America to other 
powers in their respective agendas, such as the United States, Europe and China, is forcing them to 
relegate linkages with other less relevant regions. 
That is why, taking up our initial premise, interregionalism rather than an alternative to 
bilateralism is undoubtedly a compliment. All the countries in South America observe Southeast 
Asia as a strategic area in the context of a search for diversification of both political and commercial 
partners. Based on this definition, bilateral ties —whether through official visits, missions and trade 
exchanges, accreditation of ambassadors, among others— show a steady growth in all major South 
American economies. Emerging interregional initiatives set a new level of linkages, trying to overcome 
the bilateral and unilateral diversification strategies, through policies that involve identifying regional 
objectives and strategies. Interregionalism in these cases, beyond its erratic or cyclical instability, 
feeds the existing and active bilateral relations between the states of both regions.
It is undoubtedly a challenge to follow the evolution of the links between the two regions. In 
this regard, we must add to this analysis unilateral approaches from countries in Southeast Asia to 
regional bodies in South America that allow us to discern how the South American region is identified 
and configured within the external policies of Asian countries.
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